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Abstract 
We examine how the entry of gig-economy platforms influences local entrepreneurial activity. 
On one hand, such platforms may reduce entrepreneurial activity by offering stable employment 
for the un- and under-employed. On the other hand, such platforms may enable entrepreneurial 
activity by offering work flexibility that allows the entrepreneur to re-deploy resources 
strategically in order to pursue her nascent venture. To resolve this tension we exploit a set of 
natural experiments, the entry of the ride-sharing platform Uber X and the on-demand delivery 
platform Postmates into local areas. We examine the effect of each on crowdfunding campaign 
launches at Kickstarter, the world’s largest reward-based crowdfunding platform. Results 
indicate a negative and significant effect on crowdfunding campaign launches, and thus local 
entrepreneurial activity, after entry of Uber X or Postmates. Strikingly, the effect appears to 
accrue primarily to un-funded and under-funded projects, suggesting that gig-economy platforms 
predominantly reduce lower quality entrepreneurial activity by offering viable employment for 
the un- and under-employed.  
 
Keywords: gig economy, digital platforms, innovation, crowdfunding, entrepreneurship, 
difference in difference, natural experiment 
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Introduction 
The introduction of new business models spawned by digital platforms has captured the attention 
of scholars and policy makers for decades (Bakos and Bailey 1997, Parker and Van Alstyne 
2005). While classic examples, such as eBay and Amazon.com (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, 
Chatterjee 2001, Dellarocas and Wood 2008, Forman et al. 2008), continue to generate billions 
in revenue annually, new models of platform-enabled, peer-to-peer businesses have recently 
come to the fore (e.g. AirBNB, LendingClub, Postmates, Uber, TaskRabbit). Collectively 
referred as the collaborative-, sharing-, or gig-economy; businesses of this type are anticipated to 
comprise a substantial portion of the economy in the coming years, with serious economic 
implications (Sundararajan 2014), including the disruption of long-standing industries (Morse 
2015) and displacement of incumbents (Zervas et al. 2015). Indeed, these platforms are already 
estimated to comprise a roughly $26 billion market (Malhotra and Van Alstyne 2014) and 
numerous studies have explored patterns of demand for services provided by gig-economy 
platforms (Edelman and Luca 2014, Greenwood and Wattal 2015, Zervas et al. 2015). In this 
work, we extend this literature by offering the first consideration of how the entry of these 
platforms influence local entrepreneurial activity1.   
With industry disruption comes the expectation of eventual economic growth, innovation, 
and entrepreneurship (Gans et al. 2002, Ireland et al. 2003, McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2008). 
However, existing observations provide little evidence of changes in entrepreneurial activity 
deriving from the gig-economy.2 Traditional economic measures of employment and 
                                                     
1 When referring to “entrepreneurial activity” we exclude employment on the gig-economy platform itself. For example, when 
examining the effect of Uber on local entrepreneurial activity, we treat employment as an Uber driver as out of scope. Recent 
class action law suits filed against the platforms (e.g. http://uberlawsuit.com/, http://www.uberlitigation.com/) support the view 
many drivers view themselves as employees of the firm rather than independent contractors.  
2 http://www.wsj.com/articles/proof-of-a-gig-economy-revolution-is-hard-to-find-1437932539  
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productivity are often coarse and subject to lags, making it difficult to capture changes stemming 
from relatively recent developments (Sundararajan 2014).3 Further, the a priori relationship 
between the gig-economy and entrepreneurial activity is unclear, with both the popular press and 
the scholarly community providing competing arguments. On the one hand, the introduction of 
flexible ad hoc employment may lead to greater entrepreneurial activity because it affords the 
nascent entrepreneur the ability to strategically optimize their time in order to garner the 
necessary resources to initiate a project or start a firm (Agrawal et al. 2015, Douglas and 
Shepherd 2000). Indeed, both scholarly work and the popular press have repeatedly noted that 
gig-economy businesses provide workers with an unprecedented degree of flexibility, allowing 
then to set their own schedules while earning stable pay (Hall and Krueger 2015).4,5 On the other 
hand, many researchers have noted that un- and under-employment are significant drivers of 
entrepreneurial activity. This is because people who do not believe they have other, acceptable, 
employment options may choose to engage in entrepreneurial activity because they have low 
opportunity costs (Acs and Armington 2006, Armington and Acs 2002, Fairlie 2002, Storey 
1991). If this is the case, the arrival of gig-economy platforms may slow entrepreneurial activity 
by providing alternate employment opportunities for these lower quality entrepreneurs (Block 
and Koellinger 2009).  
These two logics offer competing predictions for the effect gig-economy platform entry 
will have on rates of local entrepreneurial activity, a tension we aim to resolve. More formally, 
we ask the following question: What is the effect of gig-economy platform introduction on the 
rate and characteristics of entrepreneurial activity in a given locale? To resolve this tension, we 
                                                     
3 http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/10/rise-invisible-work/7412/  
4 http://www.nationaljournal.com/next-economy/big-questions/how-airbnb-uber-are-changing-nature-work  
5 http://venturebeat.com/2014/08/17/inside-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-flexibility-and-19-hour-days/  
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exploit a set of natural experiments: the entry of the ride-sharing service Uber and the entry of 
the on-demand delivery service Postmates into local markets. We examine the relationship 
between the entry of these services and the volume of local crowdfunding campaigns launched 
on Kickstarter, the world’s largest crowdfunding platform (Burtch et al. 2013, 2015, Rhue 2015), 
over a 21-month period between 2013 and 2015. This econometric strategy offers us two notable 
benefits. First, because the rollout of Uber and Postmates is staggered both temporally and 
geographically, i.e. the services enter different locations at different times, we are able to exploit 
a difference in difference design that mitigates many of the endogeneity concerns which are 
present when studying entrepreneurial entry. Second, by focusing on Kickstarter campaign 
launches we are able to capture an early stage of entrepreneurial activity that should respond 
more quickly to the introduction of gig-economy platforms, as compared to more traditional 
measures like firm founding and patenting (Bessen and Hunt 2007, Sundararajan 2014).  
Findings indicate that the entry of each service, viz. Uber and Postmates, into a 
geographic region results in a significant decrease in the volume of campaign launches on 
Kickstarter, and thus a decline in entrepreneurial activity. The effect is driven primarily by a 
reduction in unsuccessful campaigns, suggesting that some individuals may choose to work in 
the gig-economy rather than trying to pursue entrepreneurial projects of relatively low quality. 
The identified effects are also pronounced. For example, results indicate that Uber X’s entry into 
a location resulted, on average, in a 14% decline in the volume of campaigns launched on 
Kickstarter one year later. Economically, this translates to a decrease of more than $7.5 million 
in fundraising requests across the United States over the 21-month period of our study6. 
                                                     
6 This calculation is based on an observed median campaign request amount of $5,200, 1,440 EA-quarter observations in which 
Uber X was active, and a conservative estimate of Uber X’s average marginal effect (-0.010) on the logged count of campaign 
launches. This calculation was performed as follows: exp(0.010) campaigns per period * 1440 periods * $5,200 = $7,563,255.65. 
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Three notable contributions stem from this work. First, our results speak to an important 
debate about how gig-economy platforms influence local entrepreneurial activity. There are 
compelling theoretical reasons to believe that gig-economy platforms might either increase or 
decrease activity, and our findings suggest a decline in local Kickstarter projects (particularly 
lower quality projects) following the introduction of Uber X and Postmates.  We thus provide 
initial evidence that gig-economy jobs may, on average, substitute for lower quality 
entrepreneurial activity rather than act as a complement to higher quality entrepreneurial activity.   
Second, we consider a novel measure of entrepreneurial activity: the rate and volume of 
crowdfunding campaign launches. Unlike traditional measures of entrepreneurship and 
innovation (e.g., patenting), crowdfunding and crowdsourced activity provides a more 
transparent, short-term bellwether of the rate and scale of entrepreneurship in a given geography. 
Indeed, recent work has already begun to recognize the importance of harnessing the crowd 
when discussing innovation (Bockstedt et al. 2015). Moreover, our work also has implications 
for the sustainability of crowdfunding platforms. Because the primary effect of gig-economy 
platform entry is to reduce the volume of low-quality campaigns, the advent of the gig-economy 
is particularly important for platforms like Kickstarter, where sustainability and growth is tied to 
the crowd’s efficient and successful identification of high quality projects. Campaigns on 
crowdfunding platforms must compete for attention and capital, and thus the presence of low 
quality campaigns is likely to increase search costs for potential campaign backers or redirect 
funds that might have been better spent elsewhere. By facilitating a reduction in lower quality 
projects, the gig-economy can enable campaign backers to focus their attention on the high 
quality, high potential campaigns, resulting in more efficient capital allocation (Shane 2009).  
Third, there are clear implications for policy. Our results suggest that gig-economy jobs 
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may be particularly attractive to un- and under-employed individuals, who might otherwise have 
pursued low quality entrepreneurial projects.  While the introduction of these disruptive 
platforms may speed the demise of incumbents (Seamans and Zhu 2013), possibly eliminating 
some jobs in the process, our results suggest that individuals with weak attachments to the labor 
market may in fact benefit from this creative destruction. This detail may be important for policy 
makers to consider as they tackle the regulation and legality of these platforms.   
Finally, our work contributes to the burgeoning literature examining societal level 
impacts of information systems and digital platforms (Bapna et al. 2012, Chan and Ghose 2014, 
Chan et al. 2015, Parker et al. 2016, Rhue 2015, Seamans and Zhu 2013). Inasmuch as the 
increased digitization of daily life has brought with it both negative (Chan and Ghose 2014, Chan 
et al. 2015) and positive (Burtch et al. 2013, Greenwood and Wattal 2015) externalities, it is 
incumbent upon researchers to continue breaking open this black box both by considering both 
the overall effects of platform entry, as well the differential effects wrought the Internet 
(Edelman and Luca 2014, Greenwood and Agarwal 2015, Rhue 2015). Our work highlights one 
potentially positive effect: gig-economy platforms may provide job opportunities for individuals 
who otherwise would engage in lower quality entrepreneurial activity. 
Related Work 
Academic research on the gig-economy has proceeded along a number of fronts, ranging from 
platform design and user response (Fradkin 2013, Fradkin et al. 2014), to the effect on labor 
movements (Friedman 2014, Milkman and Ott 2014), to broader economic and societal effects 
(Edelman and Luca 2014, Greenwood and Wattal 2015, Zervas et al. 2015). The latter effects, in 
particular, have received considerable attention. Zervas et al. (2015), for example, examine the 
impact of AirBNB’s entry on the Texas hotel industry, finding strong evidence of 
cannibalization, particularly amongst lower-tier hotels. Greenwood and Wattal (2015) study the 
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effect of Uber entry on DUI fatalities and arrive at a similar conclusion when they observe that 
gig-economy services are most likely to affect price-sensitive consumers.  
However, a relative dearth of work has considered the supply side of these markets, in 
particular, who the suppliers of these services are likely to be. Given that a rigorous examination 
of supply is necessary to comprehend how these markets function, it is critical that scholars 
begin to explore these questions and understand the long term implications of the answers that 
may arise. It should be noted that three marked exceptions to the predominant focus on the 
demand side of this equation exist: Edelman and Luca (2014), who examine how racial bias 
affects AirBNB hosts, Rhue (2015), who examines the effect of racial bias on fundraising 
success, and Morse (2015), who provides a conceptual review of the impacts that P2P lending 
markets are having on consumer lending.  
In this work, we consider how the entry of gig-economy platforms might influence 
entrepreneurial activity. Although research, thus far, has focused on the economic benefits that 
the gig-economy may produce, in terms of flexible employment and micro-entrepreneurship 
(Sundararajan 2014), the predominant motive for service-provider participation in these markets 
remains an open empirical question. Examining how gig-economy platforms influence 
entrepreneurial activity in local areas allows us to speak to whether the individuals who provide 
their labor to these platforms might otherwise be engaged in other forms of entrepreneurial 
activity.  
Slack Resources and Entrepreneurship 
Why might the entrance of gig-economy platforms increase the amount of local entrepreneurial 
activity? Extant literature offers two arguments. First, scholars have argued that entrepreneurship 
depends on the availability of slack resources, i.e. resources which can be directly re-assigned to 
entrepreneurial endeavors (Agrawal et al. 2015, Richtnér et al. 2014). Because gig-economy 
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platforms have been argued to offer service providers a combination of scheduling flexibility and 
stable income, their entry may enable would-be entrepreneurs to strategically re-allocate 
constrained sets of resources in order to push a nascent idea forward (Agrawal et al. 2015). 
Second, and related to the first point, the nascent entrepreneur, unburdened by earlier resource 
constraints, may be encouraged to explore or exploit new opportunities as they emerge (George 
2005, Shah and Tripsas 2007, Voss et al. 2008). In principle, gig-economy employment may 
enable experimental sampling of potential opportunities because sufficient resources are 
available to afford it (Greve 2007, Kerr et al. 2014, Shah and Tripsas 2007). 
Significant evidence of both behaviors can be found in the empirical literature and the 
popular press. Agrawal et al. (2015), for example, find that when prestigious universities release 
their students for breaks, i.e. winter or summer vacations, there is a dramatic uptick in the 
amount of localized entrepreneurial activity around those universities; a notion that is 
corroborated by Facebook and Microsoft both being founded when Harvard was in winter 
session (Graham 2012). Similarly, Voss et al. (2008) find, in the context of professional theatre 
companies, that slack resources tend to be redeployed to explore nascent opportunities. On the 
practitioner side, significant anecdotal evidence underscores the wild success of Google and 
3M’s “free time policies,” which have led to company innovations ranging from the Post-It7 to 
Google’s secret research lab, Google X8.  
In the context of the gig-economy, this logic is compelling and would suggest that the 
inherent flexibility of contract based employment would allow the nascent entrepreneur to 
optimize her time in such a way that she could strategically redeploy time and other assets to a 
                                                     
7 http://www.historyextra.com/article/feature/velcro-viagra-10-products-were-invented-accident  
8 http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-05-22/inside-googles-secret-lab; note that Google has significantly restricted this 
policy in recent years. 
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budding venture (Douglas and Shepherd 2000). Put another way, because gig-economy firms 
like Uber or Postmates allow the entrepreneur to set her own hours (Hall and Krueger 2015), 
they offer a significant advantage over traditional employers who enforce less flexible schedules 
(Swarns 2014). If this is the case, the entrepreneur may be able to exploit this flexibility for her 
own gain, and devote resources to entrepreneurial activity without losing financial security. 
Opportunity Costs and Entrepreneurship 
Although the literature on slack resources would suggest that the entrance of gig-economy 
platforms might facilitate entrepreneurial growth, other work provides the opposite prediction. 
While many would-be entrepreneurs might depart traditional employment to pursue higher 
wages (Braguinsky et al. 2012) or increased flexibility (DeMartino and Barbato 2003, Sørensen 
2007), extant research also suggests that individuals may pursue entrepreneurship as a means of 
resolving un-employment or under-employment (Block and Koellinger 2009, Fairlie 2002, 
Storey 1991) when they cannot find work or are overqualified for their current position based on 
education or experience (Åstebro et al. 2011). It is this second class of entrepreneur who may opt 
not to pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity when presented with the employment the gig-
economy offers.  
 Why might someone who is un- or under-employed no longer pursue entrepreneurship 
after the entry of a gig-economy platform? Received research has argued that un- and under-
employed individuals pursue entrepreneurial activity because they have significantly lower 
opportunity costs than someone who is fully employed (Block and Koellinger 2009, Fairlie 2002, 
Storey 1991). As a result, they may pursue entrepreneurial activity because they have excess 
time (due to under-employment) or because the entrepreneurial activity has a higher expected 
value than their wage employment opportunities (Acs and Armington 2006, Armington and Acs 
2002).  The entrance of employment opportunities via gig-economy may change the internal 
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calculus for these would-be entrepreneurs.  Because the gig-economy appears to offer significant 
employment opportunities (for example, according to Hall & Kreuger (2015), Uber employed 
about 150,000 US-based drivers at the start of 2015; and according to the GAO, about 7.9% of 
US workers worked in contingent employment as of 20109), it is plausible that entrepreneurial 
activity may fall as a result of the gig-economy, as entrepreneurs who are un- or under-employed 
select into this new, viable alternative. Put another way, if individuals with lower opportunity 
costs pursue employment in the gig-economy, rather than pursuing entrepreneurial activity, then 
it is plausible that local entrepreneurial activity may fall as the gig-economy grows. 
The presence of compelling theoretical arguments on both sides of this debate creates a 
natural tension in the literature. On the one hand, entrepreneurial activity may rise because 
individuals can use the slack resources that are freed up via employment in the gig-economy to 
pursue new projects. On the other, if the gig-economy predominantly provides economic 
opportunities to the un- or under-employed, entrepreneurial activity may decline as those 
individuals redeploy their efforts away from entrepreneurial activity, towards gig-economy 
employment.  Therefore, in the absence of a compelling a priori expectation, we look to 
empirical analyses to determine the predominant effect.  
Methods 
Data & Descriptive Statistics 
We draw on data from multiple sources to execute our estimations. The first, the volume of 
crowdfunding campaigns launched on Kickstarter over time, are collected via Kickstarter’s API10 
through daily queries of active projects from September of 2013 through March of 2015. By 
recursively paging through the active campaign list, we capture every campaign that was live at 
                                                     
9 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-168R 
10 Kickscraper: http://syntaxi.net/2013/03/24/let-s-explore-kickstarter-s-api/ 
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any given point in time. In turn, we identify the amount of money sought and ultimately raised 
by each campaign. As our analyses focus on the staggered entry of two gig-economy platforms 
within the United States, Uber X and Postmates, we further collect data on the entry pattern of 
these platforms. Uber, founded in 2009, is a mobile smartphone application that allows 
consumers to submit a trip request, which is then routed to Uber drivers who use their own cars 
to fulfill the request. Uber X is Uber’s low-cost option. Postmates, founded in 2011, defines 
itself as an “urban logistics and on-demand delivery platform,” which connects customers with 
local couriers11. Couriers purchase and deliver goods to customers, on demand, from any retail 
location (restaurant or store) in a city. Data on Uber entry and Postmates entry are retrieved 
directly from the Uber Blog12 and from the Postmates website13, respectively. Finally, we 
incorporate dynamic socioeconomic data from the Area Resource File14.  
Econometric Specification 
The primary econometric specification we employ is a multi-site entry difference-in-difference 
(DD) relative time model (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Intuitively, this model allows us to 
conduct a quasi-experiment using secondary data because the treatments, i.e. the entry of Uber 
and Postmates, are applied in different locations at different times, in a plausibly exogenous 
manner. The longitudinal nature of the data allows us to examine the existence of pre-treatment 
trends in Kickstarter campaign activity. This data structure further enables us to include location 
and time fixed effects, which effectively control for static heterogeneity across locations, as well 
as any unobserved temporal trends or shocks (e.g., seasonality).  
Our unit of analysis is the Economic Area (EA) – month.  The Bureau of Economic 
                                                     
11 https://postmates.com/about 
12 https://blog.uber.com/ 
13 https://postmates.com/ 
14 http://ahrf.hrsa.gov/ 
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analysis divides the United States into 172 unique economic areas based on shared economic 
activity (in particular, commuting patterns).15 Our main dependent variable is the number of 
Kickstarter campaigns launched in EA i, during month t. In our initial analyses, the primary 
independent variable of interest is the dichotomous treatment variable, Uber X, which indicates 
that the ride-sharing service Uber X has entered EA i at time t. Consistent with prior work 
examining the effect of Uber’s entry on a locale (Greenwood and Wattal 2015), we focus on 
Uber X, as opposed to the premium service Uber Black, due to the significantly lower startup 
costs and larger network of drivers16. Uber Black requires a driver to use a “black car” or 
limousine, while an Uber X driver can utilize a broader range of lower cost, personal vehicles.  
Our second treatment, Postmates, also a dichotomous indicator, captures whether Postmates has 
entered EA i at time t. Both of these variables are coded as one during the first full month of 
implementation. A full list of Uber and Postmates entries by location is available in Table 1. 
Finally, to complete the difference in difference specification, we include vectors of EA and time 
fixed effects. In total, our sample includes data on 75,115 campaigns, launched across 172 EAs, 
over 21 months. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our sample. 
 We employ a relative time model, as opposed to a traditional DD estimation, because it 
enables us to evaluate the parallel trends assumption. As discussed by Angrist and Pischke 
(2008), the chief assumption of the DD estimation is that there is no pre-treatment heterogeneity 
in the trends between treated and untreated groups. If trends in the dependent variable are 
heterogeneous over time, this presents a problem, because it implies that the untreated group 
cannot serve as a valid control, i.e. reflection of what would have happened in the absence of 
                                                     
15 http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/federal_register/1995/html/bts_19950310.html 
16 Replication of our estimations using Uber Black yields no significant correlation. 
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treatment. Extensively used in extant literature (Autor 2003, Bapna et al. 2015, Chan and Ghose 
2014, Greenwood and Wattal 2015), this estimation incorporates a second set of time dummies 
that indicate the chronological distance between an observation period, t, and the timing of 
treatment in EA i. Thus, this approach not only allows us to ensure that there is no pretreatment 
heterogeneity between the treated and untreated EAs, it also lets us determine how long it takes 
for significant effects to manifest following treatment. Our final model specification is expressed 
in Equation (1):  
(1)    𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑢𝑖 ∗  φ) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡𝑗   
In this specification, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 takes two forms. In the first set of estimations, it is the raw number of 
campaigns launched in EA i at time t. In the second set, it is the ln (+1) of the number of 
campaigns launched in EA i at time t. 𝛼𝑖 represents the vector of EA fixed effects, u is an 
indicator whether or not the platform will ever enter i, and φ is the vector of relative time 
dummies. We initially model u as entry of Uber into an EA due to the greater number of such 
treatments that appear in our sample (72), as compared with Postmates (31). Time fixed effects 
(τ) are modeled in two ways: first, as year-quarter effect, and second, as a combination of a year 
fixed effect and a quarter fixed effect (capturing within-year seasonal trends). For the log 
specifications we employ an OLS estimator to allow for easily interpretable coefficients. For 
each of the non-logged specifications, we employ a panel Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood 
(or Quasi-Maximum Likelihood) estimator (PPML or PQML) (Azoulay et al. 2010, Burtch et al. 
2014, Greenwood and Gopal 2015, Simcoe 2007).  
In contrast to the fixed effects negative binomial (NB) estimator, a PPML estimator 
enables us to obtain consistent, robust standard errors (clustered by EA), even under conditions 
of over-dispersion (Wooldridge 1997). Additionally, as discussed by Allison and Waterman 
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(2002), no true fixed effect estimator has yet been proposed in the NB case, whereas a 
conditional fixed effect Poisson estimator is available. The PPML estimator has also been shown 
to significantly outperform a log-OLS specification when data contains many zeroes (Silva and 
Tenreyro 2011), as in our sample, and to provide more reliable estimates, because a log-OLS 
specification in count data can produce severely biased estimates (O’Hara and Kotze 2010), 
particularly under conditions of heteroscedasticity, as a result of Jensen’s inequality (Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006). 
Results 
Results in Table 3 reveal several interesting findings. When considering the log model in 
Columns 1 and 2, we witness some evidence of a pre-treatment difference (notable in Rel Time 
(t-6)). However, as these are the only significant time periods, with no evidence of significant 
differences in the remainder of the pre-treatment periods, the data appear to support the parallel 
trends assumption. Further, we see that the negative effect of Uber X entry on the number of 
Kickstarter campaigns becomes stable and significant roughly 2 years after implementation. 
When considering the results of the non-logged model (Columns 3 and 4), a similar and more 
robust story emerges. Not only is there no significant evidence of a pre-treatment trend in these 
regressions, but a negative and significant post treatment trend manifests and stabilizes more 
quickly, roughly one year after implementation. Specifically, estimates in Model 3 suggest that 
the number of active Kickstarter projects declines about 14% in treated EAs in the fourth quarter 
after Uber X’s entry.  Taken in sum, these estimates provide strong and significant evidence that 
the entry of gig-economy platforms reduces the number of Kickstarter campaigns in local areas. 
Additional analyses and robustness tests 
Our initial estimations suggest that there is a decrease Kickstarter campaign launches as a result 
of platform entry. We next consider an extensive set of falsification tests to ensure robustness. In 
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these tests we continue to use the relative time model, to allow for an evaluation of the parallel 
trends assumption (Angrist and Pischke 2008, Autor 2003). Further, due to the concerns raised 
by O’Hara and Kotze (2010), as well as Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011), we focus exclusively 
on the PPML count estimator. These tests include, but are not limited to, examining how other 
covariates may influence the relationship between the gig-economy platform entry and 
Kickstarter campaign launches, the validity of the control group, the possibility of false 
significance and spurious effects arising from autocorrelation (Bertrand et al. 2002), and 
accounting for the possibility of model dependence and ensuring precision of the estimated 
treatment effects by repeating our estimations on a reduced, matched sample (Iacus et al. 2012).  
Selection Model 
While our results from Table 3 provide preliminary evidence that the entrance of gig-economy 
platforms into local areas has a negative effect on the number of Kickstarter launches, we are 
mindful that Uber does not randomly select markets for entry.  While the absence of a pre-
treatment trend in our previous estimations argues against a selection interpretation of our 
results, we add control variables that help to account for factors that might make a market 
attractive to Uber while also influencing the rate of local entrepreneurial activity.  We include 
additional regressors in equation 1 which capture changes in local employment and wages. These 
include the log of the number of employed people working in the EA, the average weekly wage 
within the EA, and total quarterly wages within the EA. Results, in Table 4, corroborate our 
previous estimates. Not only do we see an absence of a pre-treatment trend in both Column 1 and 
2, but the effect becomes stable and significant 1 year after Uber X enters a market.  
Coarsened Exact Match 
The next concern we address relates to model dependence and heterogeneity between the treated 
and control groups. To the extent that unobserved and randomly distributed factors, such as 
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changes in the wealth or population of a local area which were not captured in the selection 
model, may influence the likelihood of gig-economy platforms (and Uber in particular) entering 
the local market17, it is important to minimize these potential differences. To execute this next 
text we pre-process our data, applying a Coarsened Exact Match (CEM) (Blackwell et al. 2009, 
Iacus et al. 2009, 2012), based on three covariates: population in the local area (to account for 
market size), average weekly wage (to account for the differences in average local opportunity 
costs), and current period.  
The benefits of pre-processing the data to enforce matching are four-fold. First, as 
discussed, this limits the degree of ex-ante heterogeneity between the treated and control groups, 
thereby increasing the strength of any causal claims (Overby and Forman 2014). Second, the 
match considers both univariate and multivariate imbalance between the treated and control 
groups, thereby making it significantly more flexible than a traditional propensity score match 
(Iacus et al. 2009, 2012). Third, ignoring heterogeneity between treated and control groups 
exacerbates the potential that our results are dependent on our choice of model specification 
(Iacus et al. 2011). Enforcing matching in the data in terms of control variables helps to ensure 
that the treatment indicator is independent of the other covariates. Fourth, and finally, because 
the CEM determines the matching buckets algorithmically, the researcher does not need to 
estimate them based on her own priors. Inasmuch as our own perceptions of an appropriate 
match may be biased, as a result of numerous personal confounding factors, this eliminates a 
significant concern. Results, Table 5, indicate support for our previous findings. The entry of 
gig-economy platforms significantly reduces the number of Kickstarter campaign launches 9-12 
                                                     
17 Recall that as we include EA fixed effects we are controlling for the time invariant heterogeneity between EAs. However, as 
socio-demographic characteristics may change over time, it is important to consider these dynamics.  
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months after entry.  
Random Implementation Test 
Although our results have shown striking consistency across a variety of estimations, it is equally 
important to consider potential problems with the standard errors which may result from the 
structure of the data. As discussed by Bertrand et al. (2002), “[m]ost Difference-in-Difference 
(DD) papers rely on many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes. Yet almost all 
these papers ignore the bias in the estimated standard errors that serial correlation introduces.” 
Although our initial estimates (Table 3) cluster on the EA to help account for this dependence, 
we implement one of the two major tests suggested by the authors, a random implementation 
test18, to ensure the robustness of our findings.  
To execute this test, we randomly apply our treatment to 1,440 observations in our data, 
(which corresponds to the number of treated observations), in order to create a pseudo (placebo) 
treatment.  We replicate our estimation from Equation 1 (once again constrained only to Uber X 
and regressing the dependent variable upon the constructed treatment indicators and the same set 
of fixed effects that entered into our main analyses). We then store the coefficient of this pseudo 
treatment and replicate the procedure 1,000 times. Conceptually, this test provides two major 
benefits. The first is that it helps to assess the spuriousness of any significant results obtained in 
the main analyses, arising from autocorrelation in the dependent variable (Bertrand et al. 2002). 
The second is that it provides a reliable check against outliers. Results are presented in Table 6 
and indicate i) that the estimated average β associated with the randomly assigned treatment is 
not significantly different from zero, suggesting that our main results are reliably estimated, and 
                                                     
18 The other, collapsing the data into pre and post periods with single observations, is infeasible because our treatment is applied 
in different locations at different times.  
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ii) the estimated β is quite small and not driven by serial correlation in the standard errors.  
Empirical Extensions 
Results of our robustness checks strongly suggest a relationship between gig-economy platform 
introduction and a reduction in overall Kickstarter campaigns. We next consider additional 
analyses that help to identify the mechanism underlying this effect, which we argue is a shift 
away from lower quality entrepreneurial projects and towards employment in the gig-economy.   
Postmates 
Our earlier results suggest that Uber X generates a clear negative and statistically significant 
effect on the number of Kickstarter campaign launches. However, startup costs for Uber X, while 
significantly lower than the premium car service Uber Black, are still non-trivial (inasmuch as 
the vehicles have specific requirements and can have no cosmetic damage). We therefore expand 
our analysis to consider the introduction another platform, Postmates, an on-demand courier and 
delivery service. Three significant benefits come from this approach. First, following Goldfarb 
and King (2015), we respond to active calls to safeguard our results against spurious correlation 
by replicating them using multiple datasets. Second, if the driving force behind the effect is a 
reduction in entrepreneurial activity attributable to individuals who face lower opportunity costs, 
we would anticipate that larger effects should be realized from platforms that bear lower fixed 
costs of entry for service providers. Postmates requires only that a delivery person have a 
bicycle, while Uber X requires that a driver have an automobile in relatively good condition. 
Third, as the platform may be acting as a substitute means for acquiring startup capital, i.e. the 
entrepreneur is raising money via the gig-economy instead of Kickstarter, we must rule out this 
potential alternate explanation (Younkin and Kashkooli 2013, 2016). 
Bearing this in mind, we replicate our relative time model, this time focusing on 
Postmates entry. Results are in Table 7 and contain several notable findings. First, consistent 
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with previous estimations we see a negative and significant effect emerge post platform entry. 
Second, we see that the effect of Postmates manifests more quickly (3 months after 
implementation), and that the coefficients are significantly larger, as compared to UberX (this is 
confirmed at Rel Time (t+5) by a set of pairwise Wald tests, with values of 2.35 and 2.42 
respectively, p < 0.05).   
Taken in sum these results indicate the resolution of two significant concerns which 
might undermine the argument that the change in entrepreneurial activity is a result of lower 
quality entrepreneurs selecting out of the market. First, to the degree that Postmates has 
significantly lower startup costs, we see that a platform with a lower fixed cost of entry creates a 
stronger reduction in entrepreneurial activity. Overall, this is consistent with the idea that 
individuals with lower opportunity costs are shifting their efforts away from entrepreneurship 
and towards gig-economy employment. Second, inasmuch as it is possible that Uber and 
Postmates are substituting as a means for the nascent entrepreneur to acquire excess capital, it is 
important that the lower paying platform (Postmates) have the larger effect.19 In order words, to 
the extent that a gig-economy worker might be substituting part-time work for the crowdfunding 
campaign (Hall and Krueger 2015) in order to acquire the capital necessary to launch a de novo 
venture, these results provide an important check against this explanation.20 
Failed vs. Successful Campaigns 
Our next concern relates to the quality of campaigns which have been launched, which we proxy 
with fundraising outcomes. To the extent that the gig-economy is reducing entrepreneurial 
                                                     
19 Hall and Krueger (2015) indicate Uber X drivers average salaries range between $17/hr and $29/hr while Postmates couriers 
make a median of $19/hr during peak hours - http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/04/hitting-2-million-deliveries-postmates-ceo-
bastian-lehmann-says-profitability-is-possible-in-2016/  
20 Unreported analysis also suggests that the marginal campaign size is decreasing post platform entry, further corroborating the 
fact that the platforms are not being substituted for (because it is not smaller campaigns that are selecting off the crowdfunding 
platform).  
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activity by shifting effort away from lower quality projects, we anticipate that the effect of gig 
economy platform entry is stronger (weaker) amongst crowdfunding campaigns that experience 
lesser (greater) fundraising outcomes. 
To execute this test we discretize our dependent variable into four buckets and replicate 
our estimations. The first, Unfunded Campaigns, represents campaigns which received zero 
funding. The second, Partially Funded Campaigns, represents campaigns that received some 
funding but did not reach their funding goal. The third, Funded Campaigns, represents 
campaigns that marginally met their funding goal and the fourth, Hyperfunded Campaigns, 
represents campaigns that achieved at least double their funding goal. We anticipate stronger 
effects toward the bottom of the distribution, amongst campaigns that are of lower quality and 
thus ultimately performed less well in fundraising. Results are in Table 8. As expected, we note 
that the lion’s share of the effect accumulates to campaigns which received no funding (Columns 
1 and 2). Further, we note in Columns 3-6 that there is a marginal decrease in both partially 
funded campaigns and funded campaigns, but the effect is intermittent. Strikingly, in Columns 7 
and 8, we note that there is no change amongst hyperfunded campaigns (those that top 200% of 
their funding goal). Taken in sum, these results appear to confirm our conclusion that gig-
economy platforms reduce entrepreneurial activity by allowing individuals to pursue gig-
economy employment rather than lower quality entrepreneurial projects.  
Total Dollars Pledged 
One, further, possible alternative explanation for these patterns is that these platforms are 
choosing to enter downtrodden economic areas where they know that they will be able to attract 
labor supply.  To the extent that Kickstarter funding is often provided by local individuals 
(Agrawal et al. 2010), a local economic downturn may reduce capital available to Kickstarter 
entrepreneurs while also attracting platform entry.   
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However, it is perhaps useful to note that some recent work has demonstrated that a 
significant portion of funding on Kickstarter may be supplied by non-local parties (Younkin and 
Kashkooli 2016). For example, Madsen and McMullin (2015) observe that the average 
Kickstarter project attracts backers from 22.4 distinct US cities and 6.7 states (2014). Moreover, 
our controls for employment and wages help account for this alternative explanation by 
accounting for labor patterns in the EA. Nonetheless, we replicate our relative time estimations 
using the total dollars pledged as our dependent variable, as opposed to the number of campaigns 
launched. If total dollars pledged remain stable after platform entry, it suggests that our results 
are driven by a shift in the campaigns that are launched following platform entry, rather than the 
amount of capital available that is available for investment or pledging.  Results in Table 9 
indicate no significant pre- or post-treatment trend in total dollars pledged on Kickstarter, 
suggesting that gig-economy platforms reduce the number of projects on the platforms but do not 
have an effect on total capital pledged by Kickstarter funders.  
Changes in Self-Reported Profession 
To further enhance the robustness of our results, we examine whether the entry of Uber has a 
measurable effect on local employment in the taxi and chauffeur industry.  Our argument is that 
individuals are working for Uber instead of engaging in lower quality entrepreneurial activity; 
while we lack individual-level data that allow us to show this directly, it is helpful to show that 
Uber’s entry shifts local employment towards its industry.  To do this, we replicate our main 
analysis using the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Current Population Survey (IPUMS-
CPS), the US’s largest publically available census of individual level microdata21.  These data 
                                                     
21 https://usa.ipums.org/usa/ 
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derive from quarterly surveys that allow us to track the self-reported occupation of anonymous 
individuals in a particular geographic area.  The survey design provides weights that allow the 
data to reflect the overall US population. We regress a dichotomous indicator of whether an 
individual self-reports being a paid driver or chauffer as their primary occupation (occupation 
code 53-3041) on the dichotomous indicator of Uber X entry, time fixed effects and EA fixed 
effects. Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we perform this estimation initially 
using a logit. Owing to the incidental parameters problem with fixed effects in nonlinear models, 
we then replicate the estimation with a linear probability model. We expect a positive and 
significant relationship between platform entry and individuals’ self-reporting as a paid driver.  
Results in Table 10 reveal the expected correlation. In both the LPM (Column 2) and the logit 
(Column 1) specifications, significantly more individuals report that paid driver or chauffer is 
their primary occupation after the entry of Uber X, further supporting our proposed mechanism 
that these gig-economy platforms are shifting employment patterns.  Results are robust to the 
inclusion or exclusion of survey weights. 
Discussion 
An interesting tension that arises when one considers how the rise of the gig-economy might 
influence entrepreneurial activity in other sectors.  On the one hand, gig-economy employment 
might provide individuals with flexibility and resources, thereby increasing entrepreneurial 
activity.  On the other, the presence of gig-economy platforms may direct individuals’ efforts 
towards employment on the platform, thereby reducing entrepreneurial activity.  Using a multi-
treatment difference-in-difference specification, our analyses indicate a consistent, negative 
effect of gig-economy platform entry (e.g. Uber X and Postmates) on the volume of 
crowdfunding campaign launches in a geographic area.  We find that the effect is stronger when 
the fixed cost of entry for platform service providers (e.g., Uber drivers, Postmates couriers) is 
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lower, and we find that the reduction in campaigns mainly stems from a reduction in lower 
quality projects.  Our interpretation of these results is that gig economy platforms allow 
individuals with lower opportunity costs to shift their efforts away from lower quality 
entrepreneurial projects and towards gig-economy employment.   
At least four notable contributions stem from this work. First, our results provide a 
glimpse into the supply-side of gig-economy markets, suggesting that individuals who take up 
jobs on these platforms may be directing their efforts away from relatively unpromising 
entrepreneurial activities.  While many researchers to date have considered the effect of platform 
entry on the demand side of markets (e.g. on competitors (Seamans and Zhu 2013, Zervas et al. 
2015) or consumers (Edelman and Luca 2014, Greenwood and Wattal 2015)), the supply side of 
the market remains notably understudied. Further, although we do not observe an increase in 
entrepreneurial activity, it remains possible that the scheduling flexibility afforded by 
employment in these marketplaces may enable individuals to pursue other, non-entrepreneurial 
activities that are also subject to scheduling constraints or require other forms of slack resources, 
e.g. pursuing an education, being a caregiver, or job seeking. This offers rich opportunities for 
future work which might explore alternative measures that capture these various non-
entrepreneurial activities, to better understand why individuals supply labor to these platforms. 
More generally, it is our hope that this work presents a first step into how the supply side of these 
platforms function, and that future work can build on this analysis to develop a more holistic 
understanding of participation in the gig-economy. 
Second, as alluded to previously, we offer a novel measure for entrepreneurial activity: 
the rate and volume of crowdfunding campaign launches. This measure offers several benefits 
over other measures of entrepreneurship and innovation. For example, both failed and successful 
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campaigns are immediately visible, offering researchers insights both into which entrepreneurs 
were successful and which were unsuccessful. This is a sharp departure from traditional datasets 
like VentureXpert or Y Combinator (Aggarwal et al. 2012, Greenwood and Gopal 2015, 
Sorenson and Stuart 2001), where the ability to capture both funded and unfunded entrepreneurs 
is often lacking. Further, this measure is quick to respond to changes in markets, and offers 
researchers immediate visibility into both campaign and funding dynamics in the marketplace 
(unlike more slowly moving metrics like patenting (Sundararajan 2014)). 
 Third, the differential effect on more vs. less successful campaigns is particularly 
interesting, because it suggests positive spillover benefits for crowdfunding marketplaces. The 
entry of gig-economy platforms appears to help separate wheat from chaff, reducing ‘noise’ in 
the crowdfunding marketplace. To the degree that this reduces the cognitive burden and search 
costs imposed on crowd-financers, by elevating the overall level of quality on the platform and 
thereby reducing adverse selection, this should help to ensure the sustainability of the 
crowdfunding marketplace, because the crowd, facing a budget constraint, can focus its attention 
and wealth on higher quality campaigns. In contrast, in the absence of the treatment, it is more 
likely that capital will be temporarily tied up in campaigns that are of insufficient quality to 
ultimately succeed, cannibalizing potential contributions from more deserving campaigns. 
We must also acknowledge that each of the aforementioned mechanisms may be at play, 
in tandem. In some cases, gig-economy platforms might supply would-be entrepreneurs with the 
slack resources they require to pursue their passion, whereas in other cases these platforms might 
provide gainful employment to the under- and unemployed. Our claim is that the latter 
mechanism dominates. Future work might explore these issues further, considering specific 
geographies or business domains where firm founding is most critically dependent upon the 
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availability of slack resources (such as scheduling flexibility). Individual-level data which allows 
researchers to track who engages in platform employment and who engages in entrepreneurial 
activity, simultaneously, would be incredibly valuable. 
 Finally, this work offers notable insights for policy makers who are currently debating the 
legality of services like Uber and Postmates. Although our results do not capture potential 
reductions in employment that may occur in the industries that are disrupted by the entry of a 
gig-economy platform (e.g. taxis, established courier services, hotels (Zervas et al. 2015), or 
newspapers (Seamans and Zhu 2013)), our results provide evidence that these platforms may 
provide employment opportunities for un- or under-employed individuals in other sectors. Policy 
makers may find it valuable to consider this potential benefit when deciding whether to 
accommodate these platforms. In this same vein, our work contributes to the blossoming 
literature on the broader societal impacts of information systems (Bapna et al. 2012, Chan and 
Ghose 2014, Chan et al. 2015, Parker et al. 2016, Rhue 2015). To the degree that much of this 
work is designed to inform policy, either through a change in the broad understanding of digital 
phenomena (Greenwood and Wattal 2015, Pang et al. 2014), or by highlighting the differential 
effects which accrue to different groups (Rhue 2015), our work highlights the need to continue 
down the important path of providing robust empirical evidence which informs extant debate. 
This work is, of course, subject to a number of limitations, which offer potentially fruitful 
avenues for future work. First, an important assumption in our arguments is that individuals who 
would have attempted fundraising campaigns on Kickstarter are instead choosing to work for 
Uber and Postmates. Data limitations prevent us from testing this assumption directly. Second, 
although our results indicate that failed projects decrease more than successful projects, we 
cannot make substantive comment about the quality of the campaigns which were not initiated or 
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the overall public welfare changes which result from them not being initiated. It is possible that 
some campaigns which may have been started in the absence of Uber X would have been 
extremely successful, resulting in large positive economic spillovers.  Finally, because gig-
economy platforms are a rather recent development, we are unable to examine the longer term 
consequences of their entry on entrepreneurial activity. Future work, which has access to longer 
panels of data, might examine the relationship between the entry of Uber X and the formation 
and growth of incorporated businesses. 
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Table 1: EAs Experiencing Uber X and Postmates Entry 
EA Uber X PostMates EA Uber X PostMates 
Boston, MA 6/1/2013 7/2/2014 St. Louis, MO 10/9/2014 9/17/2015 
New York, NY 8/1/2013 5/30/2013 Kansas City, MO 5/1/2014 9/17/2015 
Philadelphia, PA 10/15/2015 8/7/2014 Des Moines, IA 9/1/2014  
Washington, DC 8/1/2013 12/10/2013 Madison, WI 3/1/2014  
Richmond, VA 8/1/2014  Minneapolis, MN 9/1/2013 5/14/2015 
Greensboro, NC 8/1/2014  Omaha, NE 5/1/2014  
Raleigh-Durham, NC 6/1/2014 9/17/2015 North Platte, NE 8/1/2014  
Norfolk, VA 7/1/2014 8/3/2015 Wichita, KS 8/1/2014  
Charlotte, NC 9/1/2013 5/14/2015 Tulsa, OK 3/1/2014  
Charleston, SC 6/1/2014  Oklahoma City, OK 9/1/2013 9/17/2015 
Jacksonville, FL 5/1/2014  Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 11/1/2013 2/3/2015 
Orlando, FL 6/1/2014  Austin, TX 8/1/2014 1/5/2014 
Miami, FL 6/1/2014 9/17/2015 Houston, TX 2/1/2014 2/3/2015 
Tampa, FL 4/1/2014  Corpus Christi, TX 6/1/2014  
Atlanta, GA 10/1/2013 5/1/2015 San Antonio, TX 3/1/2014 4/15/2015 
Knoxville, TN 8/1/2014  Lubbock, TX 6/1/2014  
Lexington, KY 6/1/2014  Denver, CO 10/1/2013 9/30/2014 
Cincinnati, OH 3/1/2014  Spokane, WA 5/1/2014  
Dayton OH 8/1/2014  Boise, ID 10/1/2014  
Columbus, OH 2/1/2014 9/17/2015 Salt Lake City. UT 5/1/2014  
Pittsburgh, PA 2/1/2014 9/17/2015 Las Vegas, NV  9/30/2014 
Cleveland OH 4/1/2014  Flagstaff, AZ 9/1/2014  
Toledo, OH 6/1/2014  Albuquerque, NM 5/28/2014  
Detroit, MI 10/1/2013  El Paso, TX 6/1/2014  
Grand Rapids, MI 7/1/2014  Phoenix, AZ 8/1/2013 3/12/2015 
Milwaukee, WI 3/1/2014 9/17/2015 Tucson, AZ 2/1/2014  
Chicago, IL 4/1/2013 3/18/2014 Los Angeles, CA 9/1/2013 5/15/2014 
Fort Wayne, IN 8/1/2014  San Diego, CA 5/1/2013 9/12/2014 
Indianapolis, IN 9/1/2013  Fresno, CA 2/1/2014  
Louisville, KY 4/1/2014  San Francisco, CA 7/1/2012 12/15/2011 
Nashville, TN 12/1/2013 8/3/2015 Sacramento, CA 11/1/2013 8/13/2015 
Memphis, TN 4/1/2014  Eugene, OR 7/1/2014  
Birmingham, AL 8/1/2014  Portland-Salem, OR 7/1/2014 3/12/2015 
Montgomery, AL 8/28/2014  Seattle, WA 4/1/2013 3/6/2013 
New Orleans, LA 4/16/2015  Anchorage, AK 9/16/2014  
Baton Rouge, LA 7/1/2014  Honolulu, HI 6/1/2014  
EA Names are shortened to the largest city in the EA in the interest of space 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Campaigns 6.575695 28.1841        
2 Uber X 0.0990917 0.2987953 0.4527       
3 Postmates 0.0261492 0.1595843 0.5627 0.3593      
4 Employment 643894.7 1089218 0.5732 0.27 0.346     
5 Average Wage 687.3171 92.0522 0.3202 0.2535 0.2578 0.4116    
6 Quarterly Wage 7620000000 1.50E+10 0.5934 0.2902 0.4029 0.9897 0.4465   
7 Population 3516222 2.36E+07 0.2032 0.0086 0.0281 0.1341 0.1525 0.1296  
8 Dollars Pledged 57026.06 332493.2 0.6555 0.223 0.4188 0.532 0.2722 0.5519 0.1277 
 
Table 3: Relative Time Model of the Effect of Uber X Entry on Kickstarter Campaign Launches 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV ln(Campaigns) ln(Campaigns) Campaigns Campaigns 
Rel Time (t-6) 0.233*** 0.220*** 0.244*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0764) (0.0502) (0.0581) (0.0550) 
Rel Time (t-5) -0.144 -0.0956 -0.0122 -0.0409 
 (0.0953) (0.100) (0.0709) (0.0643) 
Rel Time (t-4) -0.0299 0.0392 -0.0447 0.00392 
 (0.0488) (0.0476) (0.0520) (0.0579) 
Rel Time (t-3) 0.0508 0.0349 0.0477 0.0147 
 (0.0407) (0.0389) (0.0551) (0.0519) 
Rel Time (t-2) 0.0154 0.00262 0.0522 0.0173 
 (0.0344) (0.0333) (0.0376) (0.0414) 
Rel Time (t-1) Omitted 
Rel Time (t0) 0.0354 0.00182 0.0394 -0.00524 
 (0.0363) (0.0345) (0.0302) (0.0263) 
Rel Time (t+1) 0.0499* 0.0633** 0.0352 -0.00369 
 (0.0289) (0.0294) (0.0342) (0.0355) 
Rel Time (t+2) 0.0466 0.0568 0.00376 -0.0358 
 (0.0378) (0.0362) (0.0432) (0.0489) 
Rel Time (t+3) 0.0306 0.0210 -0.0257 -0.0818 
 (0.0451) (0.0412) (0.0571) (0.0673) 
Rel Time (t+4) -0.0234 0.00990 -0.143** -0.168*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0441) (0.0581) (0.0648) 
Rel Time (t+5) -0.0314 -0.0249 -0.120* -0.150** 
 (0.0460) (0.0462) (0.0642) (0.0645) 
Rel Time (t+6) -0.0464 -0.0128 -0.196** -0.216** 
 (0.0590) (0.0657) (0.0764) (0.0860) 
Rel Time (t+7) -0.0938 -0.0838 -0.189** -0.222** 
 (0.0746) (0.0740) (0.0841) (0.0879) 
Rel Time (t+8) -0.160** -0.219*** -0.315*** -0.398*** 
 (0.0648) (0.0641) (0.0773) (0.0787) 
Rel Time (t+9) -0.191*** -0.0935 -0.359*** -0.330*** 
 (0.0678) (0.0703) (0.0881) (0.0949) 
Rel Time (t+10) -0.356*** -0.364*** -0.408*** -0.450*** 
  (0.0782) (0.0784) (0.0965) (0.0990) 
Economic Area Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No 
Seasonal Effects Yes No Yes No 
Quarter Effects No Yes No Yes 
N 3,612 3,612 3,612 3,612 
R-Squared 0.154 0.171   
Number of Groups 172 172 172 172 
Dependent Variable ln(Campaigns) indicates the DV is the log (+1) of the number of Kickstarter Campaigns launched in i t. Dependent Variable 
Campaigns indicates the DV is the number of Kickstarter Campaigns launched in i t. Year fixed effects indicates a time fixed effect applied at the 
yearly level. Seasonal fixed effect indicates the application of an additional seasonal fixed effect at the quarter level. Quarter fixed effect indicates 
a fixed effect for the three month period of time the observation resides in. Rel Time t-x indicates the number of quarters prior to, or after, the 
implementation of Uber X is from the focal time period. Coefficients for relative time periods prior to t-5 are estimated but not included in the 
interest of space. Estimator is an OLS for Columns 1 and 2 and a PPML for Columns 3 and 4. Standard errors are clustered on the EA for 
Columns 1 and 2. All standard errors, in parentheses, are robust and clustered on the EA- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Relative Time Model of the Effect of Uber X Entry on 
Kickstarter Campaigns with Employment Controls 
  (1) (2) 
DV Campaigns Campaigns 
Rel Time (t-6) 0.238*** 0.219*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0568) 
Rel Time (t-5) -0.0233 -0.0455 
 (0.0685) (0.0644) 
Rel Time (t-4) -0.0543 -0.000623 
 (0.0529) (0.0592) 
Rel Time (t-3) 0.0421 0.0128 
 (0.0567) (0.0528) 
Rel Time (t-2) 0.0498 0.0167 
 (0.0396) (0.0422) 
Rel Time (t-1) Omitted 
Rel Time (t0) 0.0311 -0.00832 
 (0.0308) (0.0283) 
Rel Time (t+1) 0.0249 -0.00759 
 (0.0333) (0.0360) 
Rel Time (t+2) -0.00505 -0.0389 
 (0.0446) (0.0501) 
Rel Time (t+3) -0.0350 -0.0849 
 (0.0592) (0.0686) 
Rel Time (t+4) -0.162** -0.175** 
 (0.0654) (0.0707) 
Rel Time (t+5) -0.150** -0.162** 
  (0.0732) (0.0714) 
Employment Controls Yes Yes 
EA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No 
Seasonal Effects Yes No 
Quarter Effects No Yes 
N 3,612 3,612 
Number of Groups 172 172 
Dependent Variable Campaigns indicates the DV is the number of Kickstarter Campaigns 
launched in i t. Year fixed effects indicates a time fixed effect applied at the yearly level. 
Seasonal fixed effect indicates the application of an additional seasonal fixed effect at the 
quarter level. Quarter fixed effect indicates a fixed effect for the three month period of time the 
observation resides in. Rel Time t-x indicates the number of quarters prior to, or after, the 
implementation of Uber X is from the focal time period. Coefficients for relative time periods 
prior to t-5 are estimated but not included in the interest of space. Employment controls 
indicates the log of the number of employed people, average weekly wage, and total quarterly 
wages within the EA. Estimator is a PPML. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust and 
clustered by EA – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Coarsened Exact Match Relative Time Model of the 
Effect of Uber X Entry on Kickstarter Campaigns 
  (1) (2) 
DV Campaigns Campaigns 
Rel Time (t-6) 0.199*** 0.231*** 
 (0.0752) (0.0839) 
Rel Time (t-5) -0.0503 -0.0386 
 (0.0961) (0.106) 
Rel Time (t-4) -0.0877 -0.00782 
 (0.0730) (0.0870) 
Rel Time (t-3) 0.110 0.0442 
 (0.0753) (0.0775) 
Rel Time (t-2) 0.0118 -0.00894 
 (0.0392) (0.0465) 
Rel Time (t-1) Omitted 
Rel Time (t0) -0.000814 -0.0374 
 (0.0298) (0.0294) 
Rel Time (t+1) -0.000433 -0.0482 
 (0.0397) (0.0469) 
Rel Time (t+2) -0.0113 -0.0651 
 (0.0406) (0.0505) 
Rel Time (t+3) -0.0481 -0.122* 
 (0.0509) (0.0670) 
Rel Time (t+4) -0.129** -0.192*** 
 (0.0547) (0.0632) 
Rel Time (t+5) -0.139** -0.205*** 
  (0.0608) (0.0704) 
EA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No 
Seasonal Effects Yes No 
Quarter Effects No Yes 
N 2,895 2,895 
Number of Groups 170 170 
Dependent Variable Campaigns indicates the DV is the number of Kickstarter Campaigns 
launched in i t. Year fixed effects indicates a time fixed effect applied at the yearly level. 
Seasonal fixed effect indicates the application of an additional seasonal fixed effect at the 
quarter level. Quarter fixed effect indicates a fixed effect for the three month period of time the 
observation resides in. Rel Time t-x indicates the number of quarters prior to, or after, the 
implementation of Uber X is from the focal time period. Coefficients for relative time periods 
prior to t-6 and after t+5 are estimated but not included in the interest of space. Estimator is a 
PPML. Coarsened Exact Match is executed on population of the EA, average weekly wage, 
and time period. Robust standard errors, clustered by EA, in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
32 
Table 6: Random Implementation Test 
Estimation 
Campaigns with 
Seasonal and Year 
Fixed Effects 
Campaigns with 
Quarter Fixed Effects 
μ of Random β -0.00007 0.00006 
σ Random β 0.03482 0.03443 
Estimated β (Rel Time t-4) -0.143 -0.168 
Replications 1000 1000 
Z-Score -4.105291 -4.881488 
P-Value p<0.001 p<0.001 
Dependent Variable Campaigns indicates the DV is the number of Kickstarter Campaigns 
launched in i t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Relative Time Model of the Effect of Postmates Entry 
on Kickstarter Campaigns  
  (1) (2) 
DV Campaigns Campaigns 
Rel Time (t-6) 0.0784 0.0795 
 (0.0637) (0.0545) 
Rel Time (t-5) 0.000571 0.00645 
 (0.0529) (0.0452) 
Rel Time (t-4) 0.0155 0.0459 
 (0.0364) (0.0362) 
Rel Time (t-3) 0.0311 0.0507* 
 (0.0313) (0.0277) 
Rel Time (t-2) 0.0532 0.0618** 
 (0.0366) (0.0248) 
Rel Time (t-1) Omitted 
Rel Time (t0) -0.0118 0.00244 
 (0.0344) (0.0464) 
Rel Time (t+1) -0.145*** -0.125** 
 (0.0411) (0.0567) 
Rel Time (t+2) -0.0965 -0.0937** 
 (0.0636) (0.0399) 
Rel Time (t+3) -0.171*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0415) 
Rel Time (t+4) -0.112*** -0.0997** 
 (0.0408) (0.0455) 
Rel Time (t+5) -0.345*** -0.385*** 
  (0.0706) (0.0724) 
EA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No 
Seasonal Effects Yes No 
Quarter Effects No Yes 
N 3,612 3,612 
Number of Groups 172 172 
Dependent Variable Campaigns indicates the DV is the number of Kickstarter Campaigns 
launched in i t. Year fixed effects indicates a time fixed effect applied at the yearly level. 
Seasonal fixed effect indicates the application of an additional seasonal fixed effect at the 
quarter level. Quarter fixed effect indicates a fixed effect for the three month period of time the 
observation resides in. Rel Time t-x indicates the number of quarters prior to, or after, the 
implementation of Postmates is from the focal time period. Coefficients for relative time 
periods prior to t-6 and after t+5 are estimated but not included in the interest of space. 
Estimator is a PPML. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust and clustered by EA –  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Relative Time Model of the Effect of Uber X Entry on Kickstarter Campaigns By Campaign Success 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DV 
Unfunded 
Campaigns 
Unfunded 
Campaigns 
Partially Funded 
Campaigns 
Partially Funded 
Campaigns 
Funded 
Campaigns 
Funded 
Campaigns 
Hyperfunded 
Campaigns 
Hyperfunded 
Campaigns 
Rel Time (t-6) 0.00465 -0.0334 0.280*** 0.251*** 0.133 0.125 0.0923 0.0915 
 (0.220) (0.238) (0.0993) (0.0889) (0.0913) (0.0937) (0.193) (0.195) 
Rel Time (t-5) -0.0118 -0.0523 -0.0189 -0.0552 -0.151 -0.162 0.360 0.356 
 (0.173) (0.152) (0.0700) (0.0708) (0.144) (0.139) (0.222) (0.229) 
Rel Time (t-4) -0.188 -0.0842 -0.0635 -0.00501 -0.0262 -0.00963 0.132 0.151 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.0569) (0.0626) (0.0721) (0.0749) (0.132) (0.133) 
Rel Time (t-3) 0.0168 -0.0535 0.0581 0.0166 -0.00352 -0.0139 0.183 0.176 
 (0.126) (0.112) (0.0657) (0.0619) (0.0548) (0.0540) (0.137) (0.138) 
Rel Time (t-2) 0.0744 -0.00241 0.115*** 0.0671 -0.0493 -0.0577 -0.0314 -0.0436 
 (0.100) (0.0907) (0.0440) (0.0481) (0.0627) (0.0639) (0.105) (0.108) 
Rel Time (t-1) Omitted 
Rel Time (t0) 0.0580 -0.0381 0.0819** 0.0215 -0.0411 -0.0531 -0.0718 -0.0846 
 (0.0855) (0.0671) (0.0342) (0.0318) (0.0397) (0.0367) (0.0628) (0.0666) 
Rel Time (t+1) 0.0743 -0.00370 0.0574 0.00987 -0.0343 -0.0478 0.0310 0.0192 
 (0.0866) (0.0773) (0.0461) (0.0460) (0.0395) (0.0410) (0.0853) (0.0889) 
Rel Time (t+2) -0.0296 -0.106 0.0262 -0.0209 -0.0191 -0.0336 -0.0996 -0.112 
 (0.0849) (0.0879) (0.0482) (0.0548) (0.0512) (0.0527) (0.106) (0.108) 
Rel Time (t+3) -0.0999 -0.204* -0.00556 -0.0738 -0.0448 -0.0644 -0.0535 -0.0708 
 (0.104) (0.114) (0.0677) (0.0799) (0.0574) (0.0588) (0.120) (0.125) 
Rel Time (t+4) -0.261** -0.315** -0.112 -0.141* -0.110* -0.118* -0.0455 -0.0515 
 (0.126) (0.139) (0.0687) (0.0753) (0.0639) (0.0659) (0.145) (0.145) 
Rel Time (t+5) -0.251* -0.314** -0.0664 -0.105 -0.0958 -0.104 -0.0695 -0.0804 
  (0.142) (0.143) (0.0727) (0.0762) (0.0718) (0.0720) (0.177) (0.178) 
EA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Seasonal Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Quarter Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 3,444 3,444 3,612 3,612 3,549 3,549 3,171 3,171 
Number of Groups 164 164 172 172 169 169 151 151 
Dependent Variable definitions related to the number of Kickstarter Campaigns launched in i t. Unfunded Campaigns indicates zero funding received. Partially Funded Campaigns indicate less that 
100% funding received. Funded Campaigns indicate funding goal was met. Hyperfunded Campaigns indicate 200% of funding goal reached. Year fixed effects indicates a time fixed effect applied at the 
yearly level. Seasonal fixed effect indicates the application of an additional seasonal fixed effect at the quarter level. Quarter fixed effect indicates a fixed effect for the three month period of time the 
observation resides in. Rel Time t-x indicates the number of quarters prior to, or after, the implementation of Uber is from the focal time period. Coefficients for relative time periods prior to t-6 and after 
t+5 are estimated but not included in the interest of space. Estimator is a PPML. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust and clustered by EA –  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Relative Time Model of the Effect of Uber X Entry on 
Kickstarter Pledges 
  (1) (2) 
DV Dollars Pledged Dollars Pledged 
Rel Time (t-6) 0.0521 0.0569 
 (0.175) (0.174) 
Rel Time (t-5) -0.171 -0.164 
 (0.191) (0.189) 
Rel Time (t-4) 0.112 0.103 
 (0.124) (0.123) 
Rel Time (t-3) 0.108 0.114 
 (0.0946) (0.0966) 
Rel Time (t-2) 0.0208 0.0264 
 (0.101) (0.102) 
Rel Time (t-1) Omitted 
Rel Time (t0) 0.0782 0.0859 
 (0.0586) (0.0630) 
Rel Time (t+1) -0.000292 0.00817 
 (0.0660) (0.0695) 
Rel Time (t+2) -0.0822 -0.0731 
 (0.0728) (0.0719) 
Rel Time (t+3) -0.0637 -0.0513 
 (0.0774) (0.0811) 
Rel Time (t+4) -0.0163 -0.0112 
 (0.0918) (0.0919) 
Rel Time (t+5) -0.0601 -0.0530 
  (0.109) (0.108) 
EA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No 
Seasonal Effects Yes No 
Quarter Effects No Yes 
N 3,612 3,612 
Number of Groups 172 172 
Dependent Variable is the number of dollars donated to Kickstarter Campaigns in i t. Year 
fixed effects indicates a time fixed effect applied at the yearly level. Seasonal fixed effect 
indicates the application of an additional seasonal fixed effect at the quarter level. Quarter 
fixed effect indicates a fixed effect for the three month period of time the observation resides 
in. Rel Time t-x indicates the number of quarters prior to, or after, the implementation of Uber 
is from the focal time period. Coefficients for relative time periods prior to t-6 and after t+5 are 
estimated but not included in the interest of space. Estimator is a PPML. Standard errors, in 
parentheses, are robust and clustered by EA – *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 10: Difference in Difference Estimate of Change In 
Probability of Self-Reported Occupation After Uber X Entry 
  (1) (2) 
DV Driver Driver 
Estimator Logit LPM 
Uber X 0.217*** 0.000684** 
 (0.0693) (0.000337) 
Constant -4.916*** 0.00198*** 
  (0.0873) (0.000219) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Month Effects Yes Yes 
EA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N 1,861,144 1,657,292 
Dependent Variable 0 / 1 indicator of whether or not individual self-reports as a driver or 
chauffer (Occupation code 53-3041). Year fixed effects indicates a time fixed effect applied at 
the yearly level. Month fixed effect indicates the application of an additional monthly fixed 
effect at the quarter level. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust and clustered by EA –  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
